Repairing Academic Humanities: The Blue Ribbon Committee's Remarkable Report
Three interesting takeways from this law professor about the report issued last week, this with the blessing of two leading university leaders: Chancellors Daniel Diermeier of Vanderbilt and Andrew Martin of Washington University. Beginning with the caveat that a truly informed assessment of the committee’s evaluation of academic humanities’ present state is beyond my ken, as none of these are my academic fields, the report nonetheless warrants readings from professors outside of the fields covered, including law.
First takeaway is about the merits: The report examines in deep detail the incredible echo chambers that plague scholarly inquiry in a wide range of important fields, including, inter alia, English, History, and Philosophy. The stories about exclusionary practices in departments and journals are unnerving; and certainly the report authors come with receipts. The concerns about the lack of ideological diversity is not, on its face, a new story, but the through-line in this report is from a strongly slated group of established academics, empowered actively and/or passively by senior colleagues and department leaders to decisions that stymie the objectivity pursuit of knowledge and undermine the larger objectives of the university as a place for rigorous examination of facts and the development of research that aspires to truth. To this reader at least, the report was scrupulously careful not to impugn professors who are staunch liberals and avowed activists, but has as its target decisionmaking that is not truth-seeking, and not fundamentally fair to those of heterodox views.
Notably, the report objects at various junctures to the current Right-wing war on universities, and is brave in naming names. It is only if the report is taken wholly out of context that one could draw the conclusion that the problems in academic humanities warrants threats to academic freedom and to the essential prerogative of university faculty and leadership to tackle their own festering problems without the need for purposive grand-standing by conservatives who do not share the values of the modern university and would blow up the whole enterprise.
So one takeaway, and perhaps the most ordinary one is that this report is really valuable as a fair-minded assessment, pointing to some good ideas for reform, and for that reason alone, is should be required reading for those who care about the present and future of academic research.
Second, reading this report through the lens of a legal academic, I can recognize some of the same unfortunate practices in our field. The lack of viewpoint diversity is a problem in our field. This results in exclusions of different opinions and perspectives; and also undermines the truth-seeking functions of academic research in and around the areas of law. To be sure, the issues can be different that in other fields, given that much of work can be described as advocacy work, at least at some level of generality. Urging courts to take one or another path draws on not only analysis that can be subject to more objective criteria, and so is about fact-finding and the pursuit of truth, but also conspicuous is the (informed) opinions of the authors, and, yes, their normative priors. But there is still a fundamental problem if scholarly inquiry that draws upon perspectives and methods that are unconventional or popular is not only disfavored, but crowded out of the conversation. While this report doesn’t touch academic law, I couldn’t help in reading this report to want one or more blue ribbon committees charged with the task of investigating practices in academic law. I suspect that such reports would generate valuable conversation and would, one hopes, move the needle, a needle currently stuck in the groove marked by a combination of complacency among those are comfortable with the status quo and those who relentlessly attack law schools for being too progressive and would prefer academia’s flaws to be adjudicated in the federal courts and before receptive trustees, and perhaps ultimately in blue and purple state legislatures.
A fresh look at academic law is important for a particular reason as well: We are teaching and training the next generation of lawyers, and future lawyers need to be exposed to an eclectic and diverse set of viewpoints and perspectives, this in the classroom, in practice settings, and in scholarly venues. Viewpoint diversity is important throughout the wider academic world; but it is arguably essential in law schools, where the absence of viewpoint diversity and, worse yet, the purposive exclusion of alternative, unpopular views would result in serious deficits in the education that lawyers need to practice and lead in a world that requires full understanding of multiple views and the ability to influence judges, legislators, and administrators (here speaking principally of litigation and advocacy work) who hold different views and opinions.
A final takeaway: It is quite interesting that this report comes to the marketplace of ideas as a result of the agenda of two prominent college presidents. Moreover, these are not any two presidents, but, in Martin and Diermeier, two who have been associated with a more critical perspective on contemporary university ideologies and practices and, largely for that reason, have been seen as more tolerant of some of the Trump administration’s attacks on universities. I am skeptical of the narrative that either of these presidents are MAGA-friendly in some way. Indeed, both have spoken up on behalf of the integrity of universities in the face of external threats and, further, are strong voices for both institutional neutrality and academic freedom. Nonetheless, that the basic fact that these two leaders are the ones responsible for sending this report out with their blessing will be eyebrow-raising, at least in the inside baseball world of academia. It will be interesting to see whether other university leaders will hop on board this nascent movement — I’ll call it a movement that champions deep institutional self-reflection about the problem with modern humanities — and undertakes strategies of change. I hope that this happens, but this hope is accompanied by an appreciation of the complex character of university decisionmaking and internal faculty politics.


AI systems are performing many routine legal analyses. And that is shifting the legal profession's unique contribution shifts toward the exercise of judgment under conditions of uncertainty. But, since judgment depends upon exposure to multiple methods of inquiry and competing frameworks of understanding, legal education in the age of AI requires more intellectual diversity and interdisciplinary engagement. The new bar exam needs to reflect that.